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: The Legacy of Dred Scott: A Judge's Symposium

THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT:
A JUDGE'S SYMPOSIUM*
In 1857, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court held that, ".

.

. they (Negroes) had no rights which the

white man was bound to respect." Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
at 407 (1857). The decision ended equivocation by the various states concerning the rights of slaves to claim freedom upon entering nonslave-holding
territory. This unequivocal pronouncement broke Anglo-Saxon precedent
of 85 year as enunciated by Lord Mansfield (Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng.
Rep. 499 (1772)) and established an iniquitous precedent that made it relatively easy to circumscribe the rights of "African descendants" who were
an "inferior and subject class."
Scott v. Sanford was the touchstone for sanctioning all post-Thirteenth
Amendment stigmata. Discrimination in public accommodations (Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S., 3 (1883)), common carriers (Plessy v. Ferguson,

163 U.S. 537 (1896)), public school education (Cumming v. Richmond
County Boardof Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899)), and voting rights (Grovey

v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1925)) were all bottomed on the reasoning of
Taney's semantical gymnastics.
Although probably illegally decided because of the questionability of
federal jurisdiction (See Freund, On Understanding The Supreme Court

(1951)), Scott v. Sanford marks a point of departure for Blacks that has a
dual significance. It is, at one and the same time, both a reference point for
indicating how far the legal rights of Blacks have moved and a sardonic
reminder that lest Blacks be ever watchful as a people, vestiges of the "no
rights which a white man was bound to respect" concept will continually
arise. It cannot be gainsaid that the legal rights of Blacks qua Blacks in
this country stands on the most favorable footing since the good ship Jesus
first entered upon the African slave trade. It also cannot be denied that
whatever rights have been won have come as a result of fairly bitter struggles against a background of Scott. Even perceived victories have been
tinged with the vestigial echoes of Taney's edict. As the late Judge Loren
Miller pointed out, one of the more curious issues in Brown v. Board of

Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was that the U.S. Supreme Court felt that
it could delay the personal and present constitutional rights of Black children
to a more propitious time. (Miller, The Petitioners, at 346 (1967)). The
decision in Moose Lodge v. Irvis, -

U.S. -,

92 S.Ct. 1965 (1972) most cer-

tainly can be traced directly to its precursor, Scott v. Sanford. As the
dissenters in Moose Lodge point out, the "private" club that was per* Held at N.C.C.U. Law School December I, 1973.
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mitted to discriminate on the basis of race could have not existed without the
State Liquor Authority.
While there may be uncertainty as to whether the federal government's
support of sterilization projects in Alabama, North Carolina and Georgia,
the Tuskegee "experiment" which subjected Black farmers to the ravages
of syphilis and the California and Mississippi psychosurgery projects involving Black prisoners can be traced directly to Scott, it is a fact that
Associate Justice Rehnquist, in an April 4, 1973 speech at Duke Law School,
stated that in his opinion Justice Taney was the greatest Justice to ever sit
on the U.S. Supreme Court and it was his (Rehnquist's) desire to emulate
him. (Justice Rehnquist was the author of the majority opinion in Moose
Lodge v. Irvis.)

Continued exploration must be made of both judicial attitudes and official sanction of repressive tactics. The importance of Scott cannot be
sloughed off in the face of cases such as Moose Lodge v. Irvis; Jefferson
v. Hackney, - U.S. -, 92 S.Ct. 1724 (1972); and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, - U.S. -, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973). While the

latter two decisions are not based upon race alone, as was pointed out by
the majority in Jefferson, the overwhelming proportion of recipients of Aid
to Financially Dependent Children affected by the Texas benefit reduction
formula were Black and Mexican-American. And as Justice Marshall
indicated in his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez, "inequality in the educational facilities may make for discriminatory state action." 93 S.Ct. 1278
at 1323. Justice Marshall recognized the fact that it is minority group
children who inhabit the "disadvantaged" school districts.
Wright v. Emporia City Council, -

U.S. -,

92 S.Ct. 2196 (1972), set

a precedent of sorts. It was the first time since Brown that the Supreme
Court had rendered a nonunanimous decision concerning school desegregation. The split became most apparent in the northern desegregation
case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, -

U.S. -,

93 S.Ct. 2686

(1973). Justice Powell, in a well reasoned dissent in the Colorado case,
objected primarily to the use of busing as a constitutional mandate to
achieve desegregation. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, filled with scathing
denunciations of the majority's "bald statements," and "jumbled hash of
unrelated events," went primarily to opposition to desegregation per se. His
statement concerning the inability to determine the intent of a school board
in the racial imbalance situation due to "turn overs as a result of frequent
periodic elections" (93 S.Ct. 2686 at 2723) echoes his philosophical progenitor's (Taney) question begging statement that ".

.

. the public history

of every European nation" demonstrated that the Founding Fathers did
not intend that, "the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor
their descendents, whether they had become free or not," were ever intended to be citizens. (60 U.S. 393 at 407).
There is no question of a misperception of the thrust of some recent
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decisions. Rights of minorities have in fact been circumscribed by these
pronouncements from the nation's highest court.
As part of NCCU Law School's continuing interest in exploration of
judicial attitudes, several members of the bench were invited to participate
in a symposium to examine "The Legacy of Dred Scott." Judge Bruce
McM. Wright, Criminal Court of The City of New York and Judge Ladson
Hart, Brevard District Court consented to participate in the symposium.
Judge Wright's remarks follow; Judge Hart was unable to prepare his
written remarks in time for publication in the Law Journal, however, his
general opinion was that there were no vestiges of the Dred Scott opinion
in present day America.
H.R.W
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